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Introduction 
Between 1996 and 2012, worldwide biotechnology crops expanded from 1.7 million hectares to 
170.3 million hectares (“Beyond Promises,” 2012). With the global population expected to reach 
almost eight billion by 2025 (United Nations, 2004), the ability of transgenic crops to provide 
additional nutrients and higher yields leads organizations such as the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) to push for the use of genetically modified (GM) 
plants (Pinstrup-Andersen and Cohen, 2000). However, for policy advocates such as 
Greenpeace, the risk of “genetic pollution” and negative human-health impacts are not worth the 
enhanced properties of GM crops (“Genetic Engineering”). For Greenpeace, the poverty 
alleviation aspects that biotechnology companies promote are merely a public relations move to 
make their profits from their GM products more palatable for consumers (Greenpeace 
International, 2014).  
In the spotlight of these accusations is Monsanto, one of the largest seed companies in the 
world. Its estimated market dominance of over 20 percent of global seed sales (ETC Group, 
2013) and presence in 68 countries exemplifies the company’s reach and scope. Monsanto’s 
authority is even more concentrated within the U.S., where in 2009 its seeds produced 90% of 
the soybean crop and 80% of both cotton and corn crops (Langreth and Herper, 2009). In 2011, 
corn and soybeans represented the two largest harvested crops in the United States, and with the 
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cotton crop these three commodities brought in almost $110 billion in sales (United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, 2013). Further, its 144 legal claims against U.S. farmers since 
1997 (Gillam, 2012) demonstrates its aggressive enforcement of patents rights and legal prowess 
in the agricultural market. Its immense position and the estimated two million protesters 
worldwide against GM products in May 2013 (“No More GMO,” 2013) allow Monsanto to 
provide a case study for the consequences of patents in agriculture. 
American patent policy in biotechnology gives innovators in this field a unique advantage 
compared with other patentable areas. In GM horticulture, scientists can acquire both a plant 
patent and a utility patent on their discoveries. A plant patent gives individuals protection against 
others duplicating their breed asexually, selling the plant in whole or in part, or importing the 
variety from a foreign country. Meanwhile, a utility patent covers not only the plant itself and its 
descendants, but also its method of production and the uses of the plant. This has a much broader 
scope than the plant patent and strong sway over follow-on technology and research. While the 
requirements for a utility patent are stricter, both types of patents last for 20 years in this rapidly 
changing field. Though this timeframe is the same as other industries under intellectual property 
(IP) protection by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), biotechnology’s lightning 
pace and social impact means that shutting out competition for two decades can limit the 
innovation within a specific technology before the next methods dominate the field. 
Yet this argument does not mean that IP rights are useless and that all discoveries should 
be open to the public from their moment of inception. Without patents, innovators would keep 
trade secrets to monopolize their techniques and this limits the dissemination of knowledge. By 
guaranteeing IP rights, an inventor feels comfortable publishing the details of how their 
discovery operates, what components it includes, and how to construct it. Other scientists then 
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can learn about a novel approach to a problem or a unique functionality of previous techniques. 
Further, without a monopoly period for recovering research and development (R&D) costs, 
expensive industries such as pharmaceuticals and biotechnology could instead find their 
competitors profiting from their efforts. Therefore, instead of merely vilifying the rewards 
provided to innovators through patents, this report identifies the contradictions that IP policy 
raises in biotechnology in terms of social welfare. Balancing the commercial needs of innovators 
and public interest is a complex challenge facing policymakers, and this report seeks to apply 
economic theories on biotechnology patents and to offer recommendations that could alleviate 
the cost to society. 
Therefore, while the societal benefits or harms of biotechnology form a part of the policy 
discussion of this paper, the patent system that supports the biotechnology industry is the main 
motivation of its analysis. The findings are that patent law and court rulings on the IP rights over 
basic life forms created incentives for monopolistic and obstructionist behavior. 
Biotechnological innovation in the United States is unique since innovators in agriculture can 
acquire both a plant patent and a utility patent on their discoveries. This gives the patent owner 
vast authority over not only the licensing of the technology, but also over any follow-on 
experimentation leveraging the knowledge contained within the patent. The nature of agricultural 
patents and Monsanto’s behemoth position in the market provide policy analysts with insight 
into the perils of granting monopolistic power over innovation in a vital industry. By evaluating 
the current corporate and patent environment, we can search for policies that will improve not 
only the technological landscape but which also maximize the return to the public. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. The report will begin with a literature review of 
agricultural and biotechnological patent history before exploring recent Supreme Court rulings 
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that reflect the intellectual property debate. The next section will consist of the empirical work of 
this analysis on the patent system, relying on Monsanto as a case study of its potential downfalls. 
We will leverage three concepts in economic theory: barriers to entry in the agricultural market, 
the tragedy of the anti-commons in licensing, and game theory on litigation strategies. Within 
each of these tools, we will have case studies referencing Monsanto and other patent-holding 
companies as well as the Golden Rice project, an initiative to provide beta-carotene to vitamin A 
deficient children in Asia. Following the analytical work, we will explain the economic 
implications of intellectual property policies and finally conclude with some policy 
recommendations to improve the system to work for not only innovators but also for the public. 
Literature Review 
The laws that grant Monsanto its power over the agriculture industry began in the 1930s with the 
Plant Protection Act. Originally meant to encourage breeders to pursue pest and fungi resistance 
after the devastating peach and chestnut crop failures in the late-1920s, it also provided 
intellectual property rights for asexually reproduced plants (New Developments). The peach 
yellows in the mid-1880s had spread to 15 states in the East, Midwest, and South (Lelong, 1891), 
while the chestnut blight discovered in 1907 spread at a pace of 20 to 50 miles per year and 
essentially wiped out the American chestnut by 1950 (Patel). This control over transgenic 
innovation was further solidified in the court rulings of Diamond v. Chakrabarty (1980) and Ex 
parte Hibberd (1985). The former Supreme Court case concluded with the famed perspective 
that “anything under the sun that is made by man” was patentable, including manipulated 
microorganisms. The latter ruling applied this principle to agriculture, permitting patent 
protection to genetically modified plants and their parts. Without this established legal history, 
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Monsanto may not have achieved its dominance without additional challenges from competitors 
or follow-on products. 
However, agricultural policy experts are beginning to find fault with the court’s 
decisions. Altering a small part of DNA can drastically and unpredictably change a plant’s 
functions, which does not even address the potential mutations of the organism resulting from 
the insertion of a foreign gene. As patents for gene sequences in plants are given without the full 
understanding of the results to the host, the patent can conflict with future researchers revealing a 
commercial property of the plant unrecognized by the patent-holder (Jackson, 2000). 
Furthermore, the patent may cover a sequence with few or no substitutes, which inhibits 
innovation in that genetic code. As an example, according to the National Human Genome 
Institute, patents control about one-fifth of the human genome (“Intellectual Property and 
Genomics,” 2013). A search within the U.S. Patent Trade Office database reveals that since 
1930, their staff issued over 20,000 plant patents as of January 2014. These characteristics of IP 
laws and of plant adaptability mean that patents give the patent holder power over both their 
competition in a specific field and the innovation process in that area entirely. 
Biotechnology patents are distinct from other patents due to the nature of the innovation 
they encompass. IP policy in this industry faces not only the ethical dilemma of giving 
individuals ownership over basic building blocks of nature, but also of granting patents over the 
sustenance of humanity. Monopoly prices could threaten hungry communities around the globe 
that could benefit from hardier, GM crops or nutritionally-altered products. Further, the ability of 
nature to mutate creates circumstances whereby farms or breeders could find themselves 
possessing a patented life form they did not manipulate to attain. The self-replication and 
transformative properties of organisms also makes maintaining ownership more difficult, and 
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pushes inventors to pursue damages to scare individuals from coming into any possible contact 
with their product. The ethical and logistical questions around patenting in biotechnology 
presents a conundrum unique from other patents that is not quickly solved, and forces policies to 
determine the trade-off between entrepreneurship and humanitarianism. 
Due to the negative consumer response leading to the restriction of GM products in 
countries such as Austria, France, and Germany, economists are also weighing in on the debate. 
According to a field study in New Zealand, the market share discrepancy between organic and 
labeled spray-free GM fruits was two-to-one, illustrating the customers’ preference for 
unmodified produce (Knight et al., 2005). This rejection of GM crops by certain consumers 
makes contamination costly for the industry; in 2011, Bayer paid 11,000 U.S. rice farmers $750 
million to compensate for lost exports after its herbicide-resistant variety was found in as much 
as 30 percent of U.S. rice plots (Harris and Beasley, 2011). The national economy can suffer as 
well, since in May 2013 Japan halted imports of western-white wheat and canceled an order of 
nearly 25 metric tons of the crop after a farm in Oregon discovered an unauthorized GM strain in 
its plot (Takada, 2013). On the other hand, 20 percent of children around the globe number are 
estimated to be nutrition-deficient and underweight, so the higher yields from pest-resistance and 
vitamins GM crops can provide could offer a solution to the crisis at the local level (Paul et al, 
2003). Even the farmers benefit, considering worldwide farmers’ incomes are estimated to have 
increased overall by almost $100 billion between 1996 and 2011 due to bioengineering, 
according to a study by PG Economics (“Global Economic Benefits,” 2013). 
Patent enforcement and fears of GM plant infestation in organic or conventional crops 
add another level of controversy to the debate. In 2004, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in 
favor of Monsanto’s patent rights in Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser for unlicensed use of its 
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GM seeds. While there Monsanto could not prove that Schmeiser profited from the transgenic 
seeds on his property, the ruling gave Monsanto unprecedented authority in that country to 
pursue farmers whose crops may have inadvertently been infected with genetically modified 
pollen or seeds. Since Canadian patent laws are similar to those in America, they could provide 
persuasive precedents for U.S. agricultural disputes (Rose, 2011). However, the real risk of 
contamination comes into question, since López (2003) notes that pollen and seed spread is fairly 
narrow depending on the phenotype of the plant. Yet Lopez also extrapolates that the court’s 
decision could apply to a plant that naturally mutates to assume the patented gene. 
Economic Analysis 
Barriers to Entry 
A major public concern with Monsanto is its control over the market, which it has 
partially achieved by gaining broad patents in genetic technology. In 2001, Monsanto was 
awarded US Patent 6174724 B1 on a genetic tracker for antibiotic resistance. This gene allows a 
researcher to use negative selection to test if another gene successfully transferred into a cell. By 
injecting both the gene of interest and Monsanto’s patented gene into a series of cells, the 
scientist can then expose them to a toxic level of antibiotics. Those cells that survive, therefore, 
contain the gene of interest to the scientist. Monsanto’s patented gene and another held by 
Syngenta are the primary options for gene transfer testing. With a patent on all uses of the 
antibiotic-resistant gene, researchers could avoid licensing fees only by relying on a much riskier 
and potentially less effective method. The additional effort to work around the patent is 
inefficient, and could deter researchers from the devoting their resources in that field altogether. 
The identification of gene sequence is also far less difficult than determining their 
application according to Jackson (2003), indicating that Monsanto’s efforts of discovery is far 
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less than that necessary to find a use for the gene. Furthermore, if a scientist did figure out a 
purpose for the gene Monsanto may lay claim to its commercialization. Monsanto’s authority in 
this case is known as “reach-through,” whereby the patent holders have rights to all uses of their 
technology even if the original application failed to identify the follow-on uses in the patent 
claims. Reach-through presents a difficult circumstance for innovators, since others can fully 
profit from their hard work. This reduces the incentive to participate in highly-patented fields, 
and adds additional risk of reduced revenue in those ventures. 
Monsanto also has other means to control innovation, such as through contracts with 
farmers. As of 1999, the use of “terminator seeds” or infertile seeds ended for Monsanto 
(“Monsanto Sells Terminator Seeds,” 2013) due to the outcry over its potential stranglehold over 
the agriculture industry. With this restriction, Monsanto now requires buyers to not save seeds 
produced from the patented plants and instead purchase what they need for the next season. The 
Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser case upheld this practice, even when a farmer may not be 
aware of GM crops on their property. Any use of the patented gene requires a licensing fee to 
Monsanto, and therefore farmers fear visits from Monsanto investigators who test the edges of 
their land for Roundup-resistant soybeans. 
Monsanto’s agreement also runs counter to traditional farming methods, where farmers 
select the best seeds to save for the following year based on the plant’s characteristics. Breeding 
gives farmers a greater understanding of a plant’s potential, and they develop basic knowledge 
which improves the industry. However, if their skills give them an ideal plant only after the use 
of Monsanto’s gene, they would be unable to leverage this hard work in the following season 
since they would have to destroy the seeds. Single-season crops result in a loss of traditional 
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agricultural innovation, which although less technologically advanced still furthers the 
boundaries of science. 
The Tragedy of the Anti-Commons 
With six companies in possession of 75 percent of U.S. agricultural patents as of 2005 
(Dunwell, 2005), there is apparent potential for hold ups in biotechnology. The ability of 
companies to obtain utility patents without prior knowledge of all the applications of their 
technology means that any follow-on innovation requires permission from a variety of holders. 
This is known as the “tragedy of the anti-commons,” a reinterpretation of the tragedy of the 
commons by Hellen and Eisenberg (1998). Instead of the overutilization of public goods, the 
tragedy consists of underutilization due to the number of property rights involved in a 
technological application of patented materials. 
Golden Rice is an example of the impediments of an anti-commons situation. Invented by 
the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (SFIT) and Ingo Potrykus in the 1990s, the genetically 
modified rice incorporated beta-carotene, which provides vitamin A. Around eight million 
children around the world suffer from vitamin A deficiency, and it is particularly common in 
Asia. Each year, 700,000 children perish and up to half a million are blinded from insufficient 
beta-carotene consumption (Paul et al, 2003). The Golden Rice project focused on solving this 
problem, and can provide over half of the recommended daily intake of vitamin A in just 50 
grams of grains (Tang, 2012). Although humanitarian in purpose, the production of Golden Rice 
encountered 32 holders of 70 patents who could each demand a transaction cost for a license 
(Paul et al, 2003).  
A model from Scotchmer (2004) depicts the spiraling costs of negotiating for access to 
multiple patents. In an ideal case, the intended user would be able to sign agreements with all the 
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patent holders at once so that each patent holder would receive an equal part of the user’s 
willingness to pay for the licenses. However, separate negotiations are required and each 
consecutive license becomes more vital to the commerciality of a product such as Golden Rice. 
Therefore, those patent holders begin to overvalue their technology and charge an additional fee 
than what is optimal for the user. While the additional cost could be potentially marginal, as the 
user moves through the 69 other license negotiations these surplus charges add up to a 
substantial amount. Therefore, the anti-commons property heightens rent-seeking and reduces 
the social benefit of the application method (Jackson 2003). 
This tragedy became actualized in the case of Golden Rice. Although some of the patent 
holders gave their licenses to the effort for free, the overall costs made it prohibitive for the 
inventors to move forward. To bring Golden Rice to fruition, Syngenta and Greenovation 
received exclusive rights to the product in 2000 (Paul et al, 2003). Developing nations protested 
the change in ownership, believing the inventors sold them out to companies seeking to profit 
from their plight. The Golden Rice project, however, felt it was the only way to ensure the 
commercialization of their crop in the wake of such high transaction costs. While Syngenta and 
Greenovation may seek profits which the SFIT team would have reneged in the endeavor, the 
companies still face challenges in development. These impediments range from the inability to 
export to other countries under patent law, the risk of losing their intellectual property in weak 
regulatory environments, and the need to cross-breed Golden Rice with wild versions of the 
targeted nations (Paul et al, 2003). 
Game Theory on Litigation in Patent Disputes 
After the ruling in Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, the Organic Seed Growers and 
Trade Association (OSGATA) and a group of conventional farmers decided to take preemptive 
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action against the infiltration of patented crops in their property. After being contested in the 
lower courts, the U.S. Court of Appeals dismissed OSGATA et al. v. Monsanto in 2013 due to the 
extraction of assurances from Monsanto that it will not seek damages for inadvertent transferring 
of up to one percent of its patented genes into farmers’ fields. This therefore gave the plaintiffs 
no standing to pursue further protection from future lawsuits from Monsanto for infringement. In 
an appeal to the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs noted that they face risks of contamination far 
higher than the one percent granted in the binding agreement, which some estimate could be as 
high as five percent (Hershaw, 2013), and therefore are seeking a covenant not to sue from 
Monsanto. 
As revealed in this legal dispute, the farmers felt that the costs of pursuing court 
protection against future damages outweighed the potential licensing fees to Monsanto. While it 
seems counterintuitive to pursue preemptive action when the probability of contamination is so 
low, the game-theory model below may clarify the motivations of both parties. Consider that 
Monsanto earns its normal revenues without the additional licensing fees from the OSGATA 
farmers, and that the farmers earn income from their organic and conventional fields. If 
Monsanto suspects a patent infringement and brings a suit against the farmers, both parties face 
litigation costs and the individuals in OSGATA risk paying penalties for inadvertent 
infringement. Meanwhile, the farmers near GM-using plots fear the cross-pollination or outright 
contamination of their crops due to the resulting licensing fees. 
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Table 1: Game Theory Model of Pre-Litigation Decisions of Monsanto and OSGATA  
 
Monsanto 
OSGATA 
Farmers 
 
Doesn’t pursue damages Pursue damages 
Don’t seek 
legal 
protection 
Outcome A 
(πTx, πTy) 
Outcome B 
(πTx – LF – R, πTy – LM + R)** 
Seek legal 
protection 
Outcome C 
(πTx – LF, πTy – LM)* 
Outcome D 
([PWF(πTx – LF) – PWM(πTx – LF – R)], 
[PWM(πTy – LM + R) – PWF(πTy – LM)]) 
Note: *Assumes LF<R and LM>R; **Assumes LF>R and LM<R 
Variables 
Monsanto’s baseline revenues: πTy 
OSGATA Farmers’ baseline revenues: πTx 
Litigation cost for Monsanto: LM 
Litigation cost for grouped farmers: LF 
Royalties collected by Monsanto from farmers for the life of the patent: R 
PWF: Probability that the farmers will win in court 
PWM: Probability that Monsanto will win in court 
 
In this simplified model, the best outcome for the farmers would be to avoid litigation 
and to merely earn their normal profits (Outcome A). However, for Monsanto it becomes a bit 
more complicated depending on the value of the royalties they could extract from the farmers. 
Depending on the litigation costs and additional factors not taken into account in this exercise, 
the royalties to Monsanto may outweigh the required legal costs to present their case (Outcome 
B). For the farmers, the burden of taking Monsanto to court and winning protection could be less 
than the fees (Outcome C), especially compared with the costs in losing to Monsanto’s 
allegations in the future (Outcome B). With these motivations, society ends up with the worst 
outcome as both parties have incentives to leverage the legal system (Outcome D). Litigation and 
high damage rewards further reduce the incentives to innovate since new entrants would see 
aggressive lawsuits as detrimental to their business. Legal costs therefore not only reduce some 
of the surplus for society from biotechnological advancements, but also cut back the total 
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number of industry ventures. Therefore, the public which granted the monopolies in exchange 
for technological innovation ends up potentially worse off since participants use the resources to 
seek profits or protection through court rulings. 
An intriguing twist on this case would be if the organic farmers banded together to charge 
Monsanto for their lost business and organic certification whenever they discover GM plants on 
their property. It is unclear whether the court would side with the patent holder’s IP rights or 
with the damages experienced by the organic farmers, but the United States Department of 
Agriculture places the responsibility for preventing GM contamination on the organic farmer, not 
Monsanto. Organic and conventional farmers are expected use options such as setting their crops 
to flower at a different interval than those of farmers using Roundup Ready plants, deep cleaning 
shared seed silos, or by designating a section of their crops as a buffer zone that will not be sold 
as GM-free products (McEvoy, 2013). 
Economic Implications 
The analysis above presents a depressing picture for innovation in the agricultural realm. The 
patents in existence encompass too much of the technological spectrum and the incentives of IP 
are to pursue rents rather than a socially-optimal level of licensing. One of the original solutions 
to the anti-commons consisted of consolidating companies to centralize the necessary patents for 
applied science. By 1983 in the U.S., large corporations held 70 percent of the market in seeds, 
and four companies had 50 percent to 60 percent of total sales; by 1997, small firms had only 20 
percent market share, demonstrating the rapid merging within this high risk industry (Fernandez-
Cornejo, 2004). In comparison, the pharmaceutical industry in 2007 had ten companies in control 
of around half of the patent protected drug market, with 48 percent held by competitors; this held 
true in 2012 as well (Gauntlett and Rickwood, 2013). Yet while the consolidation of patent 
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holders in agriculture may have aided company researchers to gain access to the necessary 
proprietary material for corporate projects, it also allowed those larger companies to profit from 
the lucrative ventures of others through licensing agreements and to close off potential 
competition through patent thickets. 
Another implication not discussed in the models is the pursuit of less-desirable industries 
with the patents at hand. Rommens (2010) argues that affluent consumers would value 
improvements such as enhanced taste and color. Lucrative markets such as countries within the 
EU favor organic produce over GM options, although the latter offer higher crop yields and 
could provide lower prices. The focus on these markets distorts the use of agricultural IP away 
from those technologies which would help impoverished communities. While the pursuit of 
profits forms a necessary incentive for corporate undertakings, the broad IP patents limit the 
opportunities for humanitarian efforts and can give rewards to patent holders far beyond the 
returns to society. 
However, a lack of IP protection, especially in the international arena, has negative 
consequences. Companies become reluctant to invest in foreign countries with weak patent 
enforcement and will not allow those who have access to the technology to export it to other 
regions. Jackson noted in 2000 that WIPO identified 44 countries that did not recognize patents 
for plants. As of 2011, Brazil, China, and India, currently three of the fastest growing economies 
in the world, are among those that believe that biological material does not qualify for IP (Chen 
and Yeh, 2011). Without patent protection, American companies may also be unwilling to 
maintain manufacturing or research facilities in those countries out of fear of IP theft and local 
clones of their business. For every $100 worth of agricultural output, developed nations spend $5 
in research and development while developing countries spend only 66 cents (Phillips, 2004). 
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This limits the exposure rising nations have to crop technology, and could slow their progress 
towards advanced agriculture production. 
Yet while biotechnology may be able to end hunger and nutritional deficiencies, it also 
can harm the livelihoods of farmers in developing countries. Exports are one of the fastest ways 
for those nations to gain wealth, and those countries often leverage their natural resource sector 
to their competitive advantage. Selling local produce to more lucrative markets abroad can 
provide jobs for communities, and higher yields from GM crops could expand that part of the 
economy (Kydd et al, 2000). However, even though drought and pest resistant plants could save 
a harvest from ruin, many major importing countries refuse to accept GM products. While GM 
crops would remain an option for solving local hunger, their use could also restrict the export 
options and leave the farmer with less desirable margins than before. Therefore, even if the 
farmer can blend the transgenic plant with a local crop to improve their production levels and to 
feed their neighbors, relying on GM technology could also close the farmer off from the more 
valuable foreign consumers. 
Policy Solutions 
After consolidation failed to solve the restrictive nature of agricultural patents, a more recent 
policy solution is to have non-corporate and non-governmental organizations hold a database of 
patents that are made available for entrepreneurial companies and researchers. This challenges 
the monopolistic power of those possessing broad patents, and gives innovation steered towards 
public welfare a means of achieving society’s goals affordably. One such organization is the 
Public Intellectual Property Resource for Agriculture (PIPRA), which was created by the 
Rockefeller Foundation in 2004. With more than 50 entities as members, PIPRA’s database in 
2006 contained more than 6,600 patents and patent applications (PIPRA Database, 2006). 
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However, this approach suffers from its own shortcomings because of the insider-outsider 
paradox. If a new technology that challenges the market share of those within the organization 
seeks licenses for patents in their portfolio, would the organization grant the developer access to 
the IP necessary to produce it? Thus even if the purpose of the group is to promote the interests 
of the public, it can still fall victim to self-interest when presented with a contender to their 
industrial power. Universities with patents could also feel this pressure, since their reputation and 
funding are dependent on maintaining a technological edge over their rival science schools. 
Offering their licenses to groups in the same field could lead to the next step in the 
biotechnology revolution and hurt their standing with their stakeholders. 
In 2011, President Obama signed the America Invents Act (AIA) to align U.S. patent 
practices with international standards, to ease the application requirements for filers, and to open 
a patent to post-grant review. While the opposition portion of the AIA alleviates some of the 
expertise requirements of the USPTO (since industry professionals and interested parties could 
provide technical critiques), there are still areas that this legislation does not address. Problems 
from litigation to pursue rents rather than IP justice continue to stifle smaller actors from 
entering certain areas of research: according to the Federal Trade Commission, a trial over 
biotechnology can last two to three years and cost as much as $7 million (“To Promote 
Innovation”, 2003). Furthermore, in my opinion, if society wishes to alter the incentive structure 
for biotechnological companies then a narrower scope for an awarded patent would be necessary 
to prevent reach-through and restrictive licensing practices.  
However, to understand the latest technological advancements, patent office staff needs 
to be more experienced with and aware of this quickly evolving field. The Fee Reserve Fund of 
this office should be more flexible to allow it to add expertise as necessary to keep up with 
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industry and to offer competitive salaries. Instead under the current system, it must receive its 
additional revenues through the appropriations process, a political battle that Congress 
undertakes annually. This is vital since the staff’s choices on claims rights have such extensive 
consequences to both the developed and developing worlds. Access to food and nutrition are 
becoming increasingly viewed as public goods due to their significant impacts on health and 
economic growth at the national level, and therefore politicians may want to be more concerned 
with the motivations promoted by the current patent system. 
 Another concern relating to local knowledge and indigenous techniques is also left out of 
the latest reforms. These cultural and generational insights to a specific species require a novel 
approach to patent policy to prevent its privatization by a single company. Marinova and Raven 
(2006) note several partnerships between indigenous communities and corporations that offer 
economic reimbursements to the groups that harvest or rely upon a plant for their spirituality and 
livelihood. The authors also point out its sustainability for the plant and national policies that 
defend the needs of the local communities around profit-worthy flora. Western concepts of 
ownership over natural species are neither desirable nor enforceable in certain cultures, and 
therefore the U.S. patent system should seek to provide protections and recourse for groups 
affected by American privatization in biotechnology. Expanding exemptions from patent 
infringement to cultural, humanitarian, and research requests could reduce the burdens on 
socially-oriented development and provide additional innovation in areas that benefit vulnerable 
populations. 
However, additional patent reform would be extremely difficult because of both political 
and corporate advocates. Biotechnological companies can form a major lobby group for 
representatives in the government. Yet even if these companies do not necessary contribute to 
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campaigns, congressmen with large agricultural companies or biotechnology research facilities 
in their districts will want to promote the jobs these corporate entities can generate. Constituents 
not only want higher-wage employment but also cheaper food so that they can use their money 
on other goods. Changing the current patent system could result in a painful transition for some 
groups of the public, which may backfire on the politicians supporting the policy and cause laws 
to regress into giving only more power to the rent-seeking interests in biotechnology. 
Another possible downside in patent reform would be if the laws removed incentives to 
pursue research in the field. If the government narrows the scope of corporate patents, it may 
push IP holders towards more lucrative industries that offer even less public welfare. If the 
market is rewarding technologies that develop taste- or texture-oriented products, restricting 
companies to the less profitable, more humanitarian aspects may not have the expected outcome 
of additional advancements in those areas. Rather, it could lead to an overall loss in innovation as 
companies such as Monsanto turn to their other options, such as the chemical sector. The 
purpose of patent reform would be to stimulate innovations in agricultural biotechnology, but it 
would not be worth sacrificing all technological change to reorient the industry towards only the 
most pressing needs of the world.  
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